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Historical economic growth in Asia (excluding Japan) is analysed. It is shown that 
Unified Growth Theory is contradicted by the data, which were used (but not 
analysed) during the formulation of this theory. Unified Growth Theory does not 
explain the mechanism of economic growth. It explains the mechanism of 
Malthusian stagnation, which did not exist and it explains the mechanism of the 
transition from stagnation to growth that did not happen. The data show that the 
economic growth in Asia was never stagnant but hyperbolic. The alleged dramatic 
takeoff around 1900 or around any other time did not happen.  However, the 
theory contains also a dangerous and strongly-misleading concept that after a long 
epoch of stagnation we have now entered the epoch of sustained economic 
growth, the concept creating the sense of security. The opposite is true. After the 
epoch of sustained and secure economic growth we have now entered the epoch of 
a fast-increasing and insecure economic growth.  
 
Introduction 
In science, data are treated with respect because the primary aim of science is to discover the 
truth, and for this purpose there is nothing as reliable as a good set data. Many attractive 
theories and explanations may be formulated but they all have to pass the test of data. 
Without such a test, they are just stories, which might or might not be true.  
It appears that the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005a, 2011) is in this category because it 
is repeatedly contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). In science, one 
contradicting evidence is sufficient to make the theory, in its original form, unacceptable but 
the Unified Growth Theory is contradicted more than once. Even more importantly, if not 
paradoxically, this theory is contradicted by the same data which were used during its 
development. The paradox is easily explained if we notice that Galor did not analyse 
Maddison’s data but was guided solely by impressions created by the customary disfigured 
representation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 
2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor and Moav, 2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008).   
Galor’s predecessors might be excused for believing in the existence of Malthusian 
stagnation and in the dramatic impact of the Industrial Revolution on changing the economic 
growth trajectories because these researchers were using strongly limited information. They 
                                               
1AKA Jan Nurzynski, r.nielsen@griffith.edu.au; ronwnielsen@gmail.com; 
http://home.iprimus.com.au/nielsens/ronnielsen.html 
Suggested citation: Nielsen, R. W. (2015). Unified Growth Theory Contradicted by the Economic Growth in 
Asia. http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1512/1512.05074.pdf 
 
2 
 
had no access to the excellent source of data published by the world-renown economist 
(Maddison, 2001). Galor did.  
The latest updated compilation of the economic growth data was published in 2010 
(Maddison, 2010) on the year of Maddison’s death. This new compilation includes the earlier 
published data (Maddison, 2001), which were used by Galor, but it extends them to 2008. 
Any of these compilations can be used to demonstrate that Galor’s Unified Growth Theory is 
repeatedly contradicted by data. The advantage of using the new compilation is to have better 
information about transitions from the historical hyperbolic growth to slower trajectories, the 
feature which was ignored in the Unified Growth Theory.  
Mathematical analysis (Nielsen, 2015c) of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2010) shows clearly 
that the historical economic growth, global, regional and national, was hyperbolic and that 
hyperbolic singularities were repeatedly bypassed by spontaneous diversions to slower, but 
still-increasing, trajectories. Maddison’s data bring a new insight into the interpretation of the 
historical economic growth. Such a new insight is usually welcome in science.  Maddison’s 
data challenge the concepts of Malthusian stagnation, Malthusian trap, escape from 
Malthusian trap and the dramatic impact of the Industrial Revolution on boosting the 
economic growth trajectories. It would be unreasonable to suggest that Magnusson 
deliberately created data to contradict such traditional interpretations.   
There appears to be certain reluctance in accepting hyperbolic growth because of its inherent 
singularity but trajectories can change and Maddison’s data demonstrate that hyperbolic 
growth was systematically changed to slower trajectories at the end of 1980s and the mid-
1990s (Nielsen, 2015c).  A dramatic example of a change during modern economic growth is 
Greece where the growth changed from logistic to pseudo-hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2015d). The 
economic growth in Greece is again changing to a yet-unknown trajectory.     
Hyperbolic distributions appear to be causing a problem with their interpretation because they 
create an impression of being made of two distinctly-different components, slow and fast, 
joined perhaps by a transition component, the features, which might have convinced Galor 
and other researchers to accept the doctrine of the existence of two or three different regimes 
of growth governed by two or three different mechanisms. However, this impression is based 
on an illusion because hyperbolic distributions are not made of different components. They 
represent a single, monotonically-increasing growth, which is impossible to divide into two or 
three distinctly-different components.  
These issues were discussed elsewhere (Nielsen, 2014). Any person with fundamental 
knowledge of mathematics will quickly recognise that distributions representing the historical 
economic growth are hyperbolic. Such a person would quickly realise that the analysis of 
such distributions is simple because the reciprocal values of hyperbolic distributions are 
represented by straight lines, and nothing is simpler than the analysis of straight lines.  
Hyperbolic growth is described by a simple mathematical formula: 
1( )  ( )S t a kt       (1) 
where, in our case, ( )S t is the GDP while a and k are positive constants.   
The reciprocal of the hyperbolic distribution is a straight line: 
1
 
( )
a kt
S t
       (2) 
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Different representations of data are useful in their analysis. It is like using ln ( )S t for 
exponential distributions. In both cases, more complicated mathematical distributions are 
converted to linear functions, which are easier to understand. Such conversions can also help 
in an easy identification of certain types of distributions. For instance, we know that the 
growth is exponential, or approximately exponential, if ln ( )S t or log ( )S t  is linear. Likewise, 
we know that the growth is hyperbolic if 1/ ( )S t is linear. 
Reciprocal values of data can also help in identifying easily any deviations from hyperbolic 
trend because deviations from a straight line are easy to notice. In using reciprocal values it 
should be remembered that a deviation to a slower trajectory is indicated by an upward 
bending away from the previous linear trend while deviations to faster trajectories are 
indicated by downward bending. In particular, any form of boosting or a takeoff, repeatedly 
claimed by Galor for global and regional economic growths, should be indicted by a clear 
change in the downward direction of the reciprocal trajectories.  
If the straight line fitting the reciprocal values of data remains undisturbed, it shows that there 
was no diversion to a faster or slower trajectory. In particular, if the straight line does not 
show a change in the downward direction (if the gradient of the straight line remains the 
same) we can conclude that there was no boosting in the economic growth. We obviously 
cannot claim a change of direction on an undisturbed straight line.   
It is impossible to divide a straight line into different sections and claim different mechanism 
of growth for each of such arbitrarily selected sections. It is impossible to claim, for instance, 
a transition from stagnation to growth as repeatedly claimed by Galor in his Unified Growth 
Theory if the reciprocal values of data follow an undisturbed straight line. It is impossible to 
claim the existence of takeoffs, and it is obviously impossible to claim differential takeoffs if 
there were no takeoffs.  It is also impossible to claim that the Industrial Revolution changed 
the economic growth trajectory if the reciprocal values of data demonstrate that there was no 
change, i.e. that their linear trend remained undisturbed.   
We shall use the reciprocal values of data in the analysis of the economic growth in Asia but 
we shall also use the semilogarithmic display of data because in this representation it is easy 
to study the quality of the hyperbolic fit to the small values of data. Thus, this display can 
also help to see whether the existence of Malthusian regime could be justified. 
 
Galor’s three regimes of growth 
Before proceeding with the analysis of data for Asia it might be useful to present a brief 
summary of one of the fundamental postulates of Galor’s Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 
2005a, 2011), the postulate that the historical economic growth in various countries and 
regions can be divided into three distinctly different regimes of growth governed by distinctly 
different mechanisms of growth. 
These alleged regimes are:  
1. The regime of Malthusian stagnation. This regime lasted allegedly for thousands of 
years and was characterised by random fluctuations and oscillations around a stable 
Malthusian equilibrium. Galor claims that this epoch of stagnation commenced in 
100,000 BC (Galor 2008a, 2012a). Scientific justification for this claim is unclear 
because Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001), which Galor used (but never analysed) 
during the formulation of his theory extend only down to AD 1. Extending the alleged 
epoch of stagnation to 100,000 BC sounds like a large leap of faith. However, the 
same data, when analysed, demonstrate clearly and convincingly that the three 
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regimes of growth did not exist (Nielsen, 2014) at least for the world economic 
growth and for the growth in Western Europe. Here we have the theory contradicted 
not just by one but by two sets of data, which in science is sufficient for the postulate 
to be rejected. However, Unified Growth Theory is also contradicted by the economic 
growth in Africa (Nielsen, 2015b).   
Galor claims that the regime of Malthusian stagnation was terminated in 1750, or 
around the time of the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud &  McCloskey, 1994),   
in developed countries and in 1900 in less-developed countries (Galor, 2008a, 2012a). 
How he managed to determine these dates is unclear because there is already 
sufficient evidence in Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) that Galor’s regimes 
of growth did not exist (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c).   
2. The post-Malthusian regime. According to Galor (Galor, 2008a, 2012a), this mythical 
regime was between 1750 and 1870 (overlapping the time of the Industrial 
Revolution) for developed countries but it commenced in 1900, for less-developed 
countries.  
3. The sustained-growth regime. According to Galor (Galor, 2008a, 2012a), this regime 
commenced in 1870 for developed countries and it still continues.  
The claim of different timing for the postulated distinctly different regimes of growth is an 
integral part of the Unified Growth Theory and is expressed in two other fundamental 
postulates: the postulate of the differential takeoffs and the postulate of the great divergence, 
all supported by impressions and by the incorrect interpretation of data. When closely 
analysed, all these postulated are contradicted by data used by Galor. 
The problem with accepting Galor’s theory is more than just academic: it has undesirable 
practical consequences. Galor’s concept of the three regimes of growth, the concept he 
inherited from his many predecessors, is both harmful and misleading. It creates a sense of 
security when there is none.  
According to this concept, after a long stage of economic stagnation, which lasted for many 
thousands of years, we have now managed to escape from the mythical Malthusian trap and 
we can, at last, enjoy a sustained economic growth. The opposite is true. The economic 
growth in the past was not only sustained but also secure (Nielsen, 2015c). However, it is has 
now reached an insecure stage (Nielsen, 2014, 2015d, 2015e), which requires close 
monitoring and control. The Unified Growth Theory is not only unscientific (Nielsen, 2014, 
2015a, 2015b, 2015c) but also potentially harmful.    
 
Analysis of data for Asia 
If we examine the list of countries used by Maddison (2010) we can notice that Asia 
(excluding Japan) is made primarily, if not exclusively, of less-developed countries (BBC, 
2014; Pereira, 2011). According to Galor, these countries should have experienced the epoch 
of stagnation until 1900 followed by the post-Malthusian regime commencing around that 
year. If Galor’s claims are correct, we should see clear signs of stagnation in the data until 
1900 and a clear transition (a dramatic takeoff) from stagnation to growth around that year.  
Economic growth in Asia between AD 1 and 2008 is presented in Figure 1. There is 
absolutely no correlation between the data and the three key events indicated in this figure: 
the Industrial Revolution, the alleged Malthusian regime and the alleged post-Malthusian 
regime, which were supposed to have been shaping the economic growth. 
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During the alleged Malthusian regime of stagnation, economic growth in Asia was increasing 
hyperbolically at least from AD 1000 but the point at AD 1 is also not far away from the 
calculated hyperbolic distribution. Parameters fitting the data are 32.493 10a and 
51.238 10k .   
 
Figure 1. Economic growth in Asia (excluding Japan) between AD 1 and 2008. Maddison’s 
data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with the hyperbolic distribution and with their 
unsubstantiated interpretations promoted by Galor (Galor, 2005a, 2011).  The alleged 
Malthusian regime of stagnation did not exist and neither did the alleged post-Malthusian 
regime. The growth was hyperbolic from at least AD 1000. The point at AD 1 is 88% higher 
than the calculated hyperbolic distribution. There was no dramatic transition to a new and 
faster economic growth after the imaginary epoch of stagnation claimed by Galor, no 
transition from stagnation to growth claimed repeatedly by Galor (Galor, 2005a, 2011) and no 
dramatic takeoff. The GDP is in billions of 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
 
The data show no signs of stagnation, no signs of the Malthusian steady-state equilibrium and 
no signs of Malthusian oscillations. Assuming the existence of all such features is not only 
unnecessary but also scientifically unjustified because in science complicated interpretations 
are rejected in favour of simpler explanations. The data follow a steadily-increasing 
hyperbolic distribution, suggesting a simple mechanism of growth because hyperbolic 
distributions are described by a simple mathematical formula [see the eqn (1)]. 
The data and their analysis give no support to the concept of Malthusian stagnation or to the 
steady-state Malthusian equilibrium between AD 1 and 1900 or during any other time. It 
would be incorrect to describe the steadily-increasing growth along the hyperbolic trajectory 
as stagnation. Such a regular growth suggests the presence of a strong prevailing force. Other 
random forces might have been present but they must have been averaging out (Kapitza, 
2006).  
The concept of stagnation is dramatically contradicted by data and so is the transition to the 
alleged post-Malthusian regime, which was supposed to be a transition from stagnation to 
growth. We see no such transition but a continuation of the hyperbolic growth. The claimed 
by Galor takeoff did not happen. There was a minor and hard-to-notice disturbance in the 
economic growth around 1950 but the growth soon returned to its historical hyperbolic 
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trajectory. The overall evidence in the data is that all these propping-up structures (the 
alleged different regimes of growth) are redundant and misleading. They can be removed 
because the data reveal a totally different pattern of growth.     
The data and their analysis show that nothing dramatic occurred during the alleged transition 
from the mythical Malthusian regime of stagnation to the alleged post-Malthusian regime, 
which is supposed to mark the escape from the mythical Malthusian trap and leading 
eventually to a sustained growth regime. There was no escape from the trap because there 
was no trap. During the mythical Malthusian trap the economic growth was steadily 
increasing and it was obviously unconstrained. It is futile to claim random fluctuations and 
oscillations when there are none. Why should we even contemplate to make it all more 
complicated when the data show that the growth was much simpler? 
If not for Maddison and his data, the established knowledge in the economic research would 
have remained established, but now it has to be revaluated and changed. However, new 
insights should be welcome, particularly if they suggest a simpler explanation of the 
historical economic growth.  
Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, shown in Figure 2, also demonstrate that the 
Unified Growth Theory is contradicted by the same data, which were used during its 
development, the data published by Maddison in 2001 (Maddison, 2001) but later extended to 
include economic growth during the 21st century (Maddison, 2010).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, 1/GDP, for Asia demonstrate that there is no 
correlation between the claimed events (Industrial Revolution, the alleged Malthusian regime 
of stagnation and the alleged post-Malthusian regime) and the data (Maddison, 2010). The 
postulated dramatic and remarkable takeoff around 1900 never happened. The Malthusian 
regime of stagnation and the post-Malthusian regime did not exist.  
 
During the alleged Malthusian regime of stagnation the reciprocal values of data were 
decreasing along a straight line indicating an undisturbed, hyperbolic economic growth. The 
data show also that nothing dramatic had happened at the end of this alleged epoch of 
stagnation. There was no transition to a new regime of growth. In particular, there was no 
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transition from stagnation to growth, as claimed by Galor, but a continuation of the 
hyperbolic growth. The concept of the two regimes of growth is convincingly contradicted by 
data.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
Analysis of the economic growth in Asia demonstrates that the Unified Growth Theory 
(Galor, 2005a, 2011) is contradicted by the same data, which were used (but not analysed) 
during the formulation of this theory. Economic growth was increasing along an undisturbed 
hyperbolic trajectory during and after the alleged regime of Malthusian stagnation. There was 
no transition from stagnation to growth as claimed by Galor but an undisturbed continuation 
of the hyperbolic growth. The alleged Malthusian and post-Malthusian regimes did not exist. 
They represent the redundant and misleading props promoting incorrect interpretations of the 
mechanism of the economic growth. There was no escape from Malthusian trap because there 
was no trap. The economic growth in Asia remained steady and unconstrained by any alleged 
Malthusian limitations. Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001, 2010) also show that there was no 
transition from stagnation to growth, as claimed by Galor, because the economic growth was 
never stagnant. A sign of a minor boosting can be noticed around 1950 but it was not a 
transition from stagnation to growth but a transition from hyperbolic growth to a temporarily 
slightly faster trajectory, which soon returned to its original hyperbolic trend. Galor’s 
dramatic takeoff never happened.  
In science, one contradicting evidence is sufficient to reject contradicted theory or to call for 
its thorough revision. In the case of the Unified Growth Theory there is more than one 
evidence. This theory is contradicted by the GDP data describing the world economic growth 
and the growth in Western Europe (Nielsen, 2014). It is contradicted by the GDP/cap data 
(Nielsen, 2015a). It is contradicted by the data for Africa (Nielsen, 2015b) and now it is 
contradicted by the data for Asia. However, implicitly, this theory is also contradicted by the 
extensive mathematical analysis of the economic growth in various regions and countries 
(Nielsen, 2015c) showing that the historical economic growth was hyperbolic. 
Unified Growth Theory does not explain the mechanism of economic growth. It explains the 
mechanism of stagnation, which did not exist. It explains the mechanism of transition from 
stagnation to growth, which never happened. The theory explains features that do not 
characterise the historical economic growth. It describes phantom features created by 
impressions and reinforced by the customary crude displays (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a, 
2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Galor and Moav, 
2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008) of Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001).  
Correct understanding of the historical economic growth is not just an academic issue – it has 
strong practical implications. Unified Growth Theory, which is strongly based on traditional 
doctrines, contains a dangerous and misleading concept creating a sense of security when 
there is none.  
According to this theory, after a long epoch of stagnation we have escaped the Malthusian 
trap, which was imposing strong restrictions on the economic growth, and we have now 
entered a new epoch of sustained economic growth promising the ever-increasing prosperity. 
At last, after thousands of years of the alleged Malthusian restrictions we have experienced a 
transition from stagnation to growth. The opposite is true. The past growth was not only 
sustained but also secure because it was slow and because the generated wealth was well 
below the ecological limits. The current economic growth is still sustained but unless we take 
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decisive steps to control it, it promises to be unsustainable (Nielsen, 2014, 2015d, 2015e). 
There is no room for premature celebrations.  
If we study global and regional economic growth (Nielsen, 2015c) we shall find there were 
no transitions from stagnation to growth, as claimed by Galor, but transitions from hyperbolic 
growth to slower trajectories. However, these slower trajectories continue to increase and 
they point to an unsustainable economic growth and consequently to an insecure future.   
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